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Efficient Broadcast from Trapdoor 
Functions
Yi MU a’\  Willy SUSILO a and Xinyi HUANG b 
a University o f  Wollongong 
b Nanjing Normal University
A b s tra c t.  W e present a novel schem e o f broadcast encryption that is suitable for 
broadcast servers such as pay TV services. T he important feature o f  our schem e is 
that the length o f  a broadcast string in our schem e is independent o f  the num ber o f 
receivers in the system ; hence it is suitable fo r large groups. O ur schem e is based 
on  a  trapdoor encryption technique under the R SA  assum ption. We also describe a 
variant of o u r schem e w hich  provides stronger security.
K eyw ords. B roadcast encryption
1. Introduction
Pay TV broadcasting schemes can be related to broadcast encryption, which allows a 
sender to deliver information to a group of users; each holds a different decryption key. 
The broadcast encryption was introduced by Fiat and Naor [7], Since then, there have 
been a number of schemes in the literature (e.g., [12,8,9,11]). Those schemes vary from 
bounded to unbounded number of broadcasts. They may be composed of either fixed 
user groups or variable (or dynamic) user groups. Most broadcast encryption schemes 
allow a server to deliver information to a set of users that can be dynamically formed. 
Namely, the broadcaster can determine which users will receive the information with the 
pre-defined user information. Each authorized user can recover the information by using 
the corresponding secret key.
A typical Pay TV system consists of a broadcaster and a number of subscribers. The 
broadcaster broadcasts TV programs to its subscribers. When a Pay TV program is trans­
mitted through an optical fibre or a microwave network, the protection of the program 
must be enforced against non-subscribers and also the subscribers who want to forge 
new decryption keys. A pay TV scheme can be achieved with a symmetric-key scheme, 
where all receivers share the same decryption key. Although it has the advantage of com­
putational efficiency, the key management is often problematic. Public-key schemes in 
pay TV allow each receiver to hold a different decryption key. Therefore, revocation can 
be easily done by the broadcaster.
There is a tradeoff between the following two scenarios in broadcast encryption; 
perfect user revocation and ideal computational efficiency.
C o rresp o n d en ce  to: Yi M u, School o f  IT and C om puter Science, University o f  W ollongong, W ollongong 
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To realize Scenario 1, we must assume that the encryption key is dependent on the 
number of receivers and the size of encryption data is proportional to the number of 
users. Although the broadcaster can easily add or remove a user, the drawback is obvious: 
the encryption key and the associated data must be changed whenever a user is added or 
removed. There are various realizations of Scenario 1 (eg. [4,7,9]). The recent invention 
of identity-based cryptography has also made identity-based broadcast (broadcast based 
on identities o f users) becomes feasible [3],
Scenario 2 gives us a much more efficient way in handling broadcast encryption, 
since the encryption key and associated parameters can be kept the same and independent 
of the number of receivers. This feature even stands when a new user is added to the 
system. The drawback is due to revocation. It is hard to remove a user from the system. 
The only realization of the scenario is due to Narayanan ef a(.[13]. They also tried to sort 
the revocation problem out by introducing a new parameter for each program; namely, 
the user receives such a parameter provided he subscribes the specific program. It does 
not satisfy the ultimate goal of user revocation; that is, any user should be able to be 
removed from the system by the broadcaster whenever he wants to.
Therefore, there is a tradeoff between Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. If we want to 
achieve Scenario 1, we have to make a compromise due to computational overhead. On 
contrast, if  we want to achieve Scenario 2, then we will not have a revocation advantage. 
In this paper, we are not going to find a solution to this tradeoff in which we believe there 
exists no any desirable solution. Instead, we will propose a new realization of Scenario 2 
with a more efficient encryption algorithm and provide a simple and effective revocation 
scheme that accommodates the basic needs in pay TV broadcast. We also give a variant 
of our scheme which is secure against IND-CCA2 attacks.
Bellare et ai.[2] pointed out the relation between many-to-one trapdoor functions 
and public-key cryptosystems. They found that many-to-one trapdoor functions can be 
constructed from public-key cryptosystems. Our interest is different. We are interested 
in how to construct a public-key scheme from a many-to-one trapdoor function. Our new 
scheme is based on the trapdoor algorithm that has been widely studied in the literature 
[5,6,10]. We take advantage of the algorithm to construct the cryptographic keys such 
that one encryption key maps multiple decryption keys. The security of our scheme is 
based on the RSA assumption.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. In section 2, we will give a set of 
definitions associated with our schemes and security consideration. Section 3 describes 
our new scheme based on the trapdoor technique and the security proofs to our scheme. 
Section 4 presents is a variant of our scheme, which is secure against IND-CCA2 attacks. 
The final section is our conclusion.
2. Definitions
In this section, we describe the formal definitions of our scheme and give the security 
definition.
Definition 1 Our broadcast scheme consists o f  the following four phases:
•  Setup; A probabilistic algorithm that on input a security parameter t, outputs 
definitions o f the set o f  users U, the broadcaster B , the message space M , and the
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ciphertext space C. Each user in U  obtains the associa ted  priva te  key k ij  corre­
sponding to the encryption keys y j.  For the system  with n  users and  m  programs, 
we have  1 <  i < n  and  1 <  j  <  m . A ll o ther param eters are denoted  by -k . For 
revocation purposes, we assum e that each user also obtains a sym m etric key  k* 
shared w ith the broadcaster.
•  S u b s c r ib e :  The user i subscribes program j  fro m  the broadcaster and  obtains a 
decryption key k ij, encrypted  with n j.
•  Encrypt: a probabilistic  algorithm  that on input (M , y j ), where M  E M  and  
y j  is the encryption key, outputs a  ciphertext tuple (C , p), where C  E C and p 
denotes the rem aining param eters.
•  D ecrypt: A determ inistic algorithm  that on input (C , p) and  a valid  decryption  
key, outputs the m essage M .
B ased on the definition above, w e will give two concrete schem es. O ur schem es 
are m ixed w ith ElG am al encryption and the RSA assum ption, but not incorporating the 
standard setting for ElG am al encryption. Tsiounis and Yung have given a general study 
o f E lG am al encryption security [15], They show ed that ElG am al encryption schem e is 
as secure as the D ecisional Deffie-Hellm an problem . O ur schem e differs from  this, its 
security is based on the RSA assum ption. We define security in term s o f  the sense of 
indistinguishability. Intuitively, if  it is infeasible for an adversarial algorithm  to distin­
guish betw een the encryption o f  any two m essages, even if  these m essages are given, 
then the encryption is secure. O ur first schem e is not secure against IN D -C C A 2 [?], but 
our second schem e is. We allows the attacker to access the decryption oracle even after 
he has received the challenge (the ciphertext).
D efinition 2  (Security o f  the fir s t schem e) L e t  (Setup , Encrypt, D ecrypt) be an encryp­
tion scheme. I f  we say it is secure in the sense o f  indistinguishability and  intractability o f  
the RSA assumption, then there exists no polynom ial-tim e adversarial oracle A  that, on 
input a  ciphertext, outputs the original message.
D efin ition  3 (.Security o f  the second schem e) Let (Setup , Encrypt, D ecrypt) be an 
encryption scheme. I f  we say it is secure against IND-CCA2, then there exists no 
polynom ial-tim e adversarial oracle A  that can solve the RSA problem  in polynom ial 
tim e and  on input a ciphertext, outputs the original message.
D efin ition  4 (C ollusion R esistant) G iven p  decryption keys { k i}  fo r  1 <  i < n ', there 
exist no po lynom ia l fo rg ers who can collaboratively f in d  a valid  decryption key \  such 
tha t x  <£ { h } i = i,.
We consider the scenario that the forged key is not necessarily a key generated by 
the broadcaster previously. It can be any form  as soon as it can be used to decrypt a 
ciphertext generated by the broadcaster.
2.1. Trapdoor B ased on the RSA Assum ption
In this section, we describe the trapdoor construction, w hich has been studied in the 
literature [5,6,10]. We will utilize this trapdoor construction to our new broadcast schem e 
in the next section.
Y. Mu et al. /E fficient Broadcast from  Trapdoor Functions 243
We consider the RSA setting. L et N  is the com position o f two safe prim es p  and q. 
Set cj>(N) =  (p — l ) (q  — 1). Select an integer e €  ^%{N) relatively prim e to <j>{N). The 
trapdoor is defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Trapdoor) Given g  e  Z*N o f  order cfi(N), there exist a se t o f  integers 
(Oj, bi), f o r  i  =  1, • • •, n, such that y  =  g ai bf m od  N  is a constant, where a , are selected  
fro m  and  bi are selected  fro m  Z*N .
The num ber o f trapdoors that can be found are dependent on the value o f 4>{N). It is 
trivial to find suitable (a , b) for a  €  Z ^ N ) and b e  Z*N  that for given g , y  e  Z*N  and e 
be a prim e chosen from  Z ^ N p  V =  gabe m od N  form s a trapdoor. W e find that given a 
value y  =  g abe m od N  along with g  and 1 /e ,  for each value a ' a, it is trivial to find a 
unique value bf such that y  =  g a b 'e m od N .  Note that b' =  (y g ~ a ) 1//e m od N .
For convenience in the presentation, we will om it m odulus if  it is clear.
Theorem  1 I f ( c ,  N ,  g , e ) defined above are given, the trapdoor value is x  =  g l ^e. [10]
P ro o f (Sketch): We prove that given x  along with g, e, a trapdoor can be constructed. 
Given values o f (x , a, b), com pute d =  x a b. The trapdoor can be form ed by raising the 
e-roots on both sides. We find y  =  d e =  g abe. We can find another pair (a ',b ')  by 
random ly selecting a value a ' and com puting b' =  d x ~ a . Obviously, y  =  g a b 'e. □
I f  e is a fixed public value, then the security o f the trapdoor is based on the RSA 
assum ption:
Definition 6  (RSA assum ption) L e t N  is the com position o f  two safe prim es p  and q. 
Set 4>(N) =  (p — 1 )(q  — I). Let e be an integer relatively prim e to <p(N). G iven a 
random elem ent s  selected  fro m  Z*N and a fix ed  e e  Z ^ jv ) , it is hard to f in d  x  such that 
x e =  s m od N .
We will see that this assum ption is sufficient to our schem e, since we do not require 
e to vary. M ost previous applications o f  this k ind of trapdoors are based on the strong 
RSA assum ption where e can be chosen by the attacker.
3. T he B asic Schem e (BS)
In this section, we describe our new schem e based on the trapdoor discussed above. The 
basic idea for our construction is to achieve one to m any m aps by taking advantage of 
trapdoor.
B efore going to the schem e in detail, we briefly describe how the schem e works. 
There is a broadcast server Bob who broadcasts several p rogram s to the valid subscribers. 
Any user w ho wants to get the service m ust register with Bob first to get a  perm anent 
subscription key shared with Bob. Bob possesses a  set o f  broadcast encryption keys, one 
for each program . The subscription keys are used to deliver the p rogram  keys to the users 
who have subscribed the program , respectively. These keys can be used for revocation, 
namely, B ob can refuse to send the user further program  keys i f  the user has not paid. 
For a program , each user holds a different key, all m ap to the program  encryption key.
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The scheme is given as follows in terms o f Setup, Encrypt, Subscribe, and Decrypt 
phases as defined previously in this paper.
Setup: The broadcaster sets the system up by selecting two large primes p, q, setting 
N  — pq and f ( N )  =  (p—l) (q —l) .  He also finds a number e, 8 6 relatively prime 
to 4>(N), a public generator, g e  TL*N , and sets A4 = C = X*N . Each user obtains a pair of 
secret key from the broadcaster. For User i, the secret key pair denoted by fej =  (a*, bf), 
where at 6  and bi = be{e. All {at, h }  maps to a single value of yj  for program
j .  In other words, for a fixed y j, we have yj =  gaibf mod N , i  =  1, • • •, n. which can 
be constructed as follows: select a* 6 and then compute bi =  (y jg ~ ai) l^e. The
public parameter is N  only. We have assumed that y j  is associated with a single problem 
in the Pay TV system. For a multi-program system, a suitable ty, is selected for each 
program.
Subscribe: A user wishes to subscribe a program or programs, he or she should register 
with the broadcaster and obtains a permanent subscription key «*, which is a symmetric 
key such as an AES key. This key is used to encrypt the corresponding program key 
which is then sent the subscriber. For example, if user i  has subscribed program j ,  then 
encrypted (oi, h ) along with the related parameters are sent to user i.
Encrypt: To broadcast a message M  of program j ,  the broadcaster selects a random 
r  computes the broadcast triplet (M y j , gr , r /8 ) ,  where M  € M ,  g  6  V N ,
and e e  %$(„)■ Then, the triplet (A , B , C) is broadcasted to all users.
Decrypt: Upon receiving the broadcast triplet (A , B , C), any user who has previously 
subscribed program j  can retrieve M j by computing A (B akb<̂)'~ 1 = M j for {ak , bk) S 
{uy, bi}i=
The correctness of the scheme is obvious: all users who hold a valid program de­
cryption key can retrieve the program. However, it has to be sound, i.e., only legitimate 
subscribers can retrieve the program. We discuss this issue in the next section.
3.1. Security o fB S
We consider security in our scheme as two aspects:
•  Attacks from outsiders who have not got a valid decryption key and attempts to 
find a valid decryption key that can be used to decrypt any broadcasted ciphertext 
in the corresponding program.
•  Attacks from insiders, each has got a valid decryption key and attempts to find 
another valid decryption key by collusion.
For outsider attacks, we consider the security in our scheme in the sense of indistin­
guishability [15]. We can refer our encryption scheme (omit the Subscribe phase) to as 
a variation of ElGamal encryption. Following the definition of indistinguishability [15], 
we have the following definition.
Definition 7 (Indistinguishability) An encryption scheme (Setup, Encrypt, Decrypt) 
is said to be secure in the sense o f indistinguishability, if, fo r  every polynomial time
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algorithm F  fo r  every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, fo r  every constant 
r  >  0 and fo r  every sufficiently large t,
F (1<] =  (Q> A  7 ) s.t. 0 (a , /3,7) >
1
<  —Pr
Q (a ,f3 ,y )  =
|Pr[yl(7 , EncryptSetup(1£)(a )  =  1] -  Pr[A (7 , EncryptSetup(lt)(/3) =  1] j .
Here, a , (3 €  M. and 7  is a polynomial random variable.
3.1.1. Security against Outsiders.
Although our scheme is a variation of the ElGamal encryption scheme, the security of 
our scheme is not based on the decision Diffie-Hellman problem but the RSA problem.
Let us take a look at why it is not based on the DDH problem. Given a valid cipher­
text triplet (M y T, gT, r /e ) ,  the associated DDH triplet should be (gr , y  =  g ^ ,g x ). That 
is, given gr ,g^, decide if x  =  <pr. However, in our scheme, y  is not public.
Theorem  2 I f  BS is not secure in the sense o f indistinguishability, then there exists a 
probabilistic polynomial time adversary that can solve the RSA problem with overwhelm­
ing probability.
Proof: If  our scheme is not secure in the sense of indistinguishability it suffices to show 
that we can find with non-negligible probability a pair o f plaintext messages such that 
their encryption can be distinguished with non-negligible probability o f success.
We first show that given a valid encryption triplet (A , B ,C )  and the public in­
formation N ,  the security of our scheme can be reduced to a RSA problem. Observe 
A  — M B ab ° . The adversary chooses random a' and computes A { B a ) _ 1  which should 
give the equality A ( B a )_ 1  =  b '°  if the RSA problem can be solved and b1 can be found 
in polynomial time.
Assume there exists a RSA oracle. The game for the RSA assumption is as follow:
G am e 1: Given (A , B , C) and N ,
Gl-1: Select random a ' >  1 .
Gl-2: Compute s r -  A (B a' r 1.
Gl-3: Select random b' S Z*N .
O ' ^Gl-4: Test V =  s. If yes, output 1, otherwise 0.
The adversary plays Game 1 and asks q\ queries to the RSA oracle. The probability 
of success is q i / 2 2̂ .
We then show that if the RSA oracle outputs 1, the adversary can distinguish the 
ciphertext for messages m o ,m 1. Our adversarial algorithm selects random mo, m i  6 
IAn . Then given the encryption of these messages:
{tniyra, gr° ,r 0 /9 )  <- Encrypt(rrij),
( m i - iy r i ,g Tl, r 1/6 )  Encrypt(m1_i), i e R { 0 ,1 },
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where ro , r i  €  r  Z^(N) , we only need to show given that the RSA oracle outputs 1, the 
adversary can distinguish non-negligibly better than random guessing which ciphertext 
encrypts which message (find i ). The success probability of random guess is |  +  e for a 
small number e.
If the adversary can solve the RSA problem, then he can output: (a', b'), y T° =  
B a'b 'C, and
ro  /  f  y r° (*  =  0 )Tn,iy ° /m o  =  < _ , ;
\  rriiy ° /m o  (* =  1 )
In this instance, the adversary is sure that the first ciphertext encrypts the first message 
with probability non-negligibly better than random guessing. Of course, if the RSA prob­
lem is intractable or the RSA oracle outputs 0, then the adversary cannot determine y r° . 
He can only randomly pick i. The advantage of the adversary is Pr[win] — □
3.1.2. Security against Insiders.
We consider the scenario that several valid users collude to find a valid decryption key 
which is not one of keys they currently hold. We will show that a collusion will not give 
the adversaries only advantage in gaining a new pair of decryption key.
Definition 8 (Insider Attacks) Given a set o f decryption keys
where IF is the set o f indices fo r  the set o f forgers in Us which denotes a set o f legal 
subscribers, find a new decryption key k f  such that f  g  IF, where k f  is a valid key that 
decrypts all messages belonging to the same program.
R em ark: Since r  is unique to the ciphertext in the program, a successfully forged de­
cryption key must be independent to r. For example, we consider the following case to 
be a unsuccessful forgery. Given a valid key k =  (a, 6) and a valid ciphertext (A , B , C), 
we select a ' at random and try to find the corresponding 6' °  from 6' °  =  B^a~a 6̂° .  
Although 6' °  along with a ' can also be used to decrypt (A, B , C), it is dependent on r  
and cannot be used to decrypt other ciphertexts in the program.
Theorem  3 Our scheme is secure against collusion attacks from insiders i f  the RSA 
problem is intractable.
Proof (Sketch): Observe that a user does not learn (g , bit e), which prevents him from 
finding the trapdoor value x  =  g r! e. It is trivial to see that if the these values are known 
to two users, x  can then be found: Assuming there are four forgers; each possesses a 
valid decryption key, (oi, fc,), for i =  1, • • •, 4. Given the first and second ones, we find 
they have the relation: 62/61 =  (ga i~a2) 1/le. Similarly, for the third and four ones, we 
have 64/63 =  (p03- ° 4) 1 /e. The forgers can then try to find two suitable integers a  and /? 
such that a ( a i  — a fj  +  /3(az — a f) =  1. With the resulting a  and /3, they can compute 
{ b i / W Y ^ / h Y  =  g x/ e =  x. Once x  is found, they can compute other decryption 
keys.
Therefore, in our scheme (g, bi, e) are not given to the users. With a similar attack 
to the above, at best the forgers can compute (62/ 61) °  and (64/ 63) °  which are equal 
to gr<-a 1~ aA and gr(a2 - a* \ respectively. Using the same approach, they obtain a pair of 
(a , (3) and thus gr . Since gr is public, they gain nothing from it. □
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4. The Scheme with IND-CCA2 Security
Soldera et al.[ 14] proposed an encryption scheme that is claimed having IND-CCA2 
security under the DDH assumption. His scheme is a variant of Zheng-Seberry scheme 
[16], which is believed insecure under IND-CCA2 [14], The reader is referred to [1] for 
more information. We have shown that our scheme is not based on the DDH but the RSA 
assumption. However, their algorithm can be converted into our scheme, although the 
security assumption is different.
The Setup and Subscribe of the scheme are the same. Here, we give the Encrypt 
and Decrypt phases:
Encrypt: Select random r ,9  € Z ^jv). compute u = y r , v  = H (M \\u ), w  =  M \\v, 
A  = uw, B  =  gr , C  =  rS. The resulting ciphertext is (A , B , C).
Decrypt: Compute A ( B ab° ) ~ 1 =  M \\v ' =  w', and then verify the decryption by check-
Theorem 4 Our scheme is secure against the CCA2 attacks in the random oracle model 
assuming that the RSA assumption is intractable.
Proof (Sketch): There exists a simulator that simulates the encryption oracle as follows. 
The simulator is different from the “standard" one which can randomly pick an encryp­
tion key. We assume that the encryption key is fixed to suit our scheme better. There 
exits a decryption oracle. The adversary can send any ciphertext, which might not be 
necessarily from the simulator, to the decryption oracle and obtain a pair (yi} M f).
On input two random messages M 0, M \ e  Z*N , the simulator outputs the encryption 
of these messages:
(uc,yr° ,g T° ,r i i /e ,u a =  y r° ,v o =  H (M 0\\uo),Wo =  M 0||uo) <— Encrypt(mj),
(u iy T\ g r i , r i / 6 ,u i  = y r\ v 1 -  JT(M'1||u 1),to i =  M i\\v i)  <- Encrypt(M i_i ),
where ro, 7T Gr  Z $(n )- If the RSA assumption is intractable, then the adversary picks i 
randomly. The advantage of the adversary is Pr(win) —
The ciphertext strings are sent to the decryption oracle. If the RSA assumption is 
trackable to the adversary, the adversarial algorithm outputs a forgery: (a ',b '), y ro =
The result is distinguishable to the adversary who is sure that the first ciphertext encrypts 
the first message with probability non-negligibly better than random guessing, because 
y l  is associated with the forged key (a', V) Of course, if the RSA problem is intractable, 
then the adversary cannot determine y r° . □
5. Conclusion
m g H (M \ \£ )= v l
i £ r  {0,1},
/ r~ C
B a V , and if the adversary chooses i =  0, then
We propose an efficient broadcast encryption scheme based on the many trapdoor func­
tion by the assumption that the RSA problem is not solvable in polynomial time. Our
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scheme achieves the same goals given in the original Pay TV paper but is more efficient. 
We also described a variant of our scheme, which provides IND-CCA2 security.
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